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ARTICLES
Party System Change and Parliamentary
Scrutiny of the Executive in Italy
PAOLA MATTEI
Conventional wisdom suggests that internal institutionalisation of parliamentary pro-
cedures causes greater policy effects on executive decisions and secondary legislation.
The role played by parliaments in policy-making depends on internal processes, but it
also depends on other factors, such as the changing structure of the party system – the
bipolarisation of which determines the legislative opposition’s strategy and perform-
ance. The empirical research discussed in this paper shows that the Italian parliamen-
tary process for approving and implementing secondary legislation changed
considerably – from pervasive and substantive to formalistic and procedural –
during the 1990s, as a result of the parliamentary opposition behaving differently in
response to the accomplished alternation in government. Despite the greater institutional-
isation of the Italian Parliament, parliamentary scrutiny of secondary legislation has in
fact had a diminishing impact on policy. This paper evaluates the increasingly limited
power of parliamentary committees to amend delegated legislation in draft against a
comparative analysis of the law-making process and performance of the opposition.
The effect on policy of parliamentary scrutiny of secondary legislation is found to
be proportionately related to consociational practices during the legislative process.
The scrutiny of parliaments is greater when the balance between the legislative
majority and opposition is characterised by consociational practices.
The effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny, in terms of qualitative impact on
secondary legislation,1 depends on the transformative resources of parliament,
and more generally on the centrality of parliament to the policy-making
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process – in Mezey’s terminology, on active legislatures rather than reactive.2
The Italian Parliament has been ranked as having the greatest effect on policy
in Western Europe.3 It is highly institutionalised, remarkably resilient in the
face of the political turmoil of the 1990s, and continuously developing its
organisational complexity.4 However, the relationship between the degree
of institutionalisation and the role of the Italian Parliament in influencing
secondary legislation is not as unambiguous as claimed. Parliamentary
hyper-activity and hyper-institutionalisation of procedures do not coincide
readily with policy impact. This raises the question of empirical assessment
of the qualitative nature of parliamentary scrutiny of delegated legislation,
namely the potential parliamentary influence on executive policy decisions.
This paper traces the evolution of the Italian Parliament’s influence over
legislative executive decrees in the 1990s (decreti legislativi), and relates
this to changes in the behaviour of the parliamentary opposition during the
legislative control of drafts from the executive. The aim is to assess
whether the Italian Parliament’s ability to change government policies by
amending the secondary legislation submitted for parliamentary approval
diminished in the 1990s as a result of the bipolarisation of party competition.
Credible and accomplished alternation in government changes the behaviour
and strategies of the parliamentary opposition, which must be perceived by the
electorate as presenting an alternative policy programme. The alternation in
government partially mitigates the problem of parties lacking real differen-
tiation in their policy programmes and being unable to articulate clear
policy alternatives between which voters can choose.5 The polarisation of
the party system, which is accepted by the Italian electorate,6 creates the
most favourable conditions for an alternation in government, as it did in the
1996 and 2001 general elections.
What this paper attempts to demonstrate is that the quality of parliamen-
tary impact and its effectiveness depend primarily on variables which go
beyond parliamentary procedures and the extent of internal institutional-
isation, and include the dynamics of party competition. In Italy throughout
the 1990s, the changing quality of parliamentary scrutiny – broadly from
‘substantive’ to ‘legalistic’ impact7 – indicates that the Italian Parliament is
neither an isolated and independent actor, nor a microcosm shielded from
external actors and institutions, counter to the claims of those who minimise
the influence of the electoral arena and the external environment.8 As far as
parliamentary scrutiny of delegated legislation is concerned, internal pro-
cedures matter because they constrain the government’s behaviour. Recent
reforms of the standing order of the lower chamber suggest that parliamentary
scrutiny of delegated legislation has indeed been procedurally and institution-
ally strengthened.9 But even a highly institutionalised and organisationally
complex parliament, such as in Italy, can adapt to external changes and is
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inevitably affected by them. As the structure of the Italian Parliament becomes
increasingly government-centred, and the de facto legislative veto power of
small parties is reduced to an executive ‘prejudice’ associated with a majority
democracy, there are fewer opportunities for substantive participation by the
opposition in the parliamentary decision-making process. This is because
majority and bipolar rules offering alternating coalition should reduce conso-
ciational practices in parliament.10 The bipolarisation of party competition has
increased transparency, and possibly accountability, between parliamentary
majority and opposition. Parties in opposition are no longer alienated from
the system. The factions which are not in government do not just wait for
the next reshuffle, but have real prospects of gaining office and offering
alternative policies to the electorate.11
Therefore, the increasingly dualistic nature – typical of the model of alter-
nation12– of the dynamics of the parliamentary majority and the opposition,
has rendered consociational practices between the opposition and the majority
less central to the internal functioning of the Italian Parliament. This
cooperation, essential to the centrality of parliament in the policy-making
process, characterised the legislative process, especially in the formation of
relatively minor legislation (leggine).13 However, the applicability of the ‘cen-
trality thesis’ of the Italian parliamentary arena remains to be reappraised as
far as policy-making is concerned, given the intrinsically heightened steering
capacity of the executive during the legislative process of delegated legis-
lation, combined with the increasing use and expanding scope of instruments
of delegated legislation14 as a way to enact contentious structural reforms
rather than technical matters in most sensitive policy areas – such as health
care, pensions and public employment. If the Italian Parliament’s institutional
legitimacy in the political system no longer depends on fulfilling the role of
‘compensation chamber’,15 this ensuing centrality of parliament might need
to be reconsidered; particularly given the exponential increase in the use of
delegated legislation for enacting structural and far-reaching reforms during
the 1990s.16
Although it is difficult to assess empirically the exact contribution of the
parliamentary opposition to draft legislative decrees, owing to consociational
practices, the function of integration, and the lack of publicity given to com-
mittee work, it is both possible and illuminating to study parliamentary scru-
tiny of delegated legislation as an empirical phenomenon. In this context, the
central role of parliament is understood to affect policy outcome rather than
the functions of representation and legitimation. Parliamentary scrutiny of del-
egated legislation is defined in this paper as ‘more or less effective’ depending
on whether the substantive issues of secondary legislation are altered by the
parliamentary majority and/or opposition ex ante, that is before the executive
decree is issued.
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This paper compares two distinct legislative processes regarding complex
structural health care reforms, focusing in particular on the most contentious
issues which entail confrontation between the majority and opposition parties,
so as to maximise the identifiability of the performance of the opposition in the
parliamentary debate. The 1993 Ciampi government legislative decree and the
1999 Prodi government decree reforming health care are analysed.17 Both
were aimed at implementing far-reaching reforms affecting wide-ranging
aspects of the national publicly integrated health care system, but attention
is focused here on the public employment terms and conditions of hospital-
based doctors, that is Article 15 of both decrees. This article is an attempt
to regulate the access and recruitment, functions and private consultancy prac-
tice of the medical profession, mainly stipulated by law in Italy.18 This analy-
sis focuses on the amending legislative work on secondary legislation, carried
out by standing parliamentary committees of both chambers. The performance
of the opposition is assessed mainly on the basis of its legislative input in
creating, revising and defeating the legislative majority’s proposed amend-
ments during the formulation of the committees’ resolutions. The analysis
looks at both chambers of the Italian Parliament.
GOVERNMENT, OPPOSITION AND LEGISLATIVE DECREES IN ITALY
Parliament and Legislative Decrees
Delegated legislation has been analysed as far as it impinges on the execu-
tive–legislative subsystem,19 to assess the extent to which the increased
usage of decree authority is responsible for shifting the constitutional
balance from the legislature to the executive in any given political system.
Delegated legislation is distinctive in so far as it provides the executive
with formal policy leadership resources to guide the legislative process.
However, the usage of instruments of delegated legislation is far from being
simply a displacement of law-making from parliament to the executive, or a
consequence of parliamentary decline. Instead, it represents a peculiar way
for the executive ‘to handle the parliamentary process’.20 The legislative
process associated with delegated legislation does not exclude parliamentary
involvement. This paper does not attempt to address the changing nature of
executive–legislative constitutional balance. It focuses on the consolidation
throughout the 1990s of a new, and increasingly predominant, procedural
and continually sustained interpretation of executive prerogatives in the exer-
cise of legislative functions. This is not a question of departure from the con-
stitution,21 nor a question about the relative winners and losers of delegated
legislation, nor about the alleged ‘abuses’ of the executive. As Morisi has
argued, delegated legislation is a sui generis way of representation and
decision-making.22 The legislative process of delegated legislation is distinct
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from government bills for its a priori expected executive autonomy in
law-making.23
This paper investigates the impact of parliamentary scrutiny of draft
legislative decrees (decreti legislativi), a peculiar form of delegated authority,
submitted for ex ante and formal judgement (parere) to the relevant standing
committees in both chambers.24 Legislative decrees are attractive because
they are hybrid instruments which offer the executive the possibility of
co-legislating with parliamentary committees rather than imposing its policy
decisions with decree-laws. Decreti legislativi are executive decrees which
have the force of law and are issued by the government in accordance with
the principles and criteria set out in their parent enabling law, enacted by par-
liament in the form of an ordinary legislation.
In addition to the distinctive process associated with legislative decrees
and the opportunity such decrees offer for co-legislation, another reason for
concentrating on the study of this type of delegated legislation is that parlia-
mentary scrutiny, generally of executive actions, and more specifically of sec-
ondary legislation, had acquired unprecedented empirical predominance by
the end of the 1990s.25 The total number of legislative decrees increased expo-
nentially throughout the 1990s. In the X Legislature (1987–92) the total
number of decrees issued by the executive was 129, and in the XIII (1996–
2001) it increased to 425 (of which 242 derived from enabling laws not
connected to the implementation of European directives). The increase in
the use of this instrument combines with its increased centrality as a mechan-
ism for implementing far-reaching and complex reforms. The reforms of the
welfare state, public employment and administrative decentralisation have
mainly been implemented through delegated legislation instead of primary
legislation and government bills.
As regards procedural constraints and opportunities, it could be argued
that formal procedures are merely a legal technicality and that policy analysis
of the legislative process should reduce them to a minimum.26 The policy
process arguably cannot be confined to the formalistic study of parliamentary
procedures. Yet these procedures have a pervasive political significance for
and impact on the majority–opposition relationship, for they offer various
institutional and political resources, including resources to individual MPs
and parliamentary groups. First, formal procedures make the mechanisms of
the legislative process more transparent than consociational practices would
allow,27 thus linking with greater accountability the electoral and parliamen-
tary arenas. Secondly, the institutional rules structuring parliamentary scrutiny
of legislative decrees offer an opportunity for mediation and consensus build-
ing between the majority and the opposition. Thirdly, rather than inhibiting the
leading role of the executive in delegated legislation, the kind of parliamentary
scrutiny that exists in the Italian Parliament serves the interests of the
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executive in two ways. First, the government can draw on the expertise of
committees and the bodies that they consult, including pressure groups, for
the hearings. This parliamentary contribution helps the executive in drafting
the legislation.28 Secondly, the heavy substantive scrutiny of the parliamen-
tary committees offers the executive the opportunity to share political respon-
sibility for contentious reforms, as well as the blame, if necessary.29 This is
more evident and useful in coalition governments.30
The formal procedures of parliamentary scrutiny of legislative decrees are
established by three legal sources: the constitution, the standing orders of the
chambers, and the additional provisions contained in the enabling law, which
transfers legislative authority (legge di delega) to the executive. As far as the
constitution is concerned, Article 76 establishes three conditions for the trans-
fer of legislative authority to the executive through an enabling law: the
explicit statement in the enabling law of principles and criteria of delegation;
a fixed term duration of delegation; and the definition of the matter of
delegation. Article 72 of the constitution excludes the possibility of enacting
enabling laws through the decentralised function of legislative authority to
parliamentary committees (sede legislativa).31 In the light of Article 76 of
the constitution, Article 14 of Law no. 400 of 1988 establishes that, when
the duration of delegated legislative authority exceeds two years, the execu-
tive must submit a draft for approval to the standing committees of both
chambers of parliament. As Figure 1 shows, the committee judgement is for-
mulated by the relevant standing committees within 60 days. Committees have
a prominent role in debating – for a time of up to four months – the merits of
the draft presented by the executive, questioning members of the government,
requesting evidence from outside bodies, and holding hearings with interest
groups.32 The committees can also request the opinion of other committees,
the most relevant usually being Constitutional Affairs (I) and Budget (V).
During this time the committees may also receive reports from other insti-
tutions, such as the Court of Accounts, or the Council of State, or independent
agencies.33 After receiving the judgement, the executive has 30 days to alter
its draft legislative decree accordingly.
In addition to the ample time allocated to debating the draft decree
in parliament, parliamentary contribution to the legislative process is
preventive – the parliamentary judgement is adopted before the executive
has issued legislative decrees and they have acquired the force of law –
which is a significant incentive for substantive parliamentary scrutiny. It
must be noted that parliamentary judgements are not binding,34 but consti-
tutional doctrine has established that they can be ignored ‘only with valid
reasons’, which must be stated in the final decree issued.35 The preventive
nature of parliamentary scrutiny is fundamental, as it inserts the parliamentary
arena directly into the policy-making process and establishes an a priori
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impact. In practice, the parliamentary function ceases to be consultative and
becomes a direct scrutiny of executive legislative powers.36 Parliament auth-
orises the executive to legislate, but in fact ends up co-legislating with it.37
The 1993 Ciampi Health Care Reform and the Legislative
Process of Amendment
The process of debating and amending the legislative decrees reforming the
health care sector in 1992–93, enacted respectively by the Amato and
Ciampi governments, illustrates the arrangements, scope and impact of
parliamentary scrutiny under a cooperative type of majority–opposition
relationship in parliament. This paper concentrates on some of the more con-
tentious issues associated with the health care reforms, namely the public
employment of hospital-based consultants. In May 1993, the Ciampi govern-
ment presented a draft legislative decree to the parliamentary committees of
Social Affairs in the lower chamber and Health Care in the Senate. This
decree amended the 1992 Amato reform, which had been widely contested
by the parliamentary majority and large parts of civil society.38
FIGURE 1
PARLIMENTARY SCRUTINY OF LEGISLATIVE DECREES
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There were two particularly problematic issues regarding public employ-
ment. The first of these was the exclusion of categories of salaried state
employees (Article 8), and the second, the access and recruitment, functions,
and performance evaluation of the most senior hospital consultants, who
enjoyed the same legal status as senior civil servants (dirigenza sanitaria)
(Article 15). The government legislative decree implied that some categories
of doctors would cease to be public sector salaried and would be forced to
become independent contractors with the public sector or self-employed.
For instance, the draft decree provided for the renewal of the general prac-
titioners’ contracts with the public sector, but not for that of specialist
doctors in local surgeries. The latter would become self-employed and
would be paid on a fee-for-service basis,39 losing the job security and privi-
leges associated with public sector employment.40
Specialists in local surgeries were not the only category of doctors
‘neglected’ by the 1993 draft legislative decree. The contractual arrangements of
emergency doctors within public sector employment were not clearly defined
either. The omission of 30,000 ‘emergency doctors’ was particularly proble-
matic for general practitioners, because of the risk that emergency doctors
could be included in the same public contract as them, thus enlarging the
supply of GPs. The Federazione Italiana Medici di Medicina Generale
(FIMMG), the leading association of general practitioners and paediatricians,
claimed that not distinguishing between general and emergency medicine
would result in the latter soon ‘invading’ the job market of the former.41
The final judgement of the lower chamber’s Social Affairs Committee
considerably amended the draft legislative decree excluding specialists in
local surgeries and emergency doctors from public sector employment, and
proposed to maintain all of them in the public sector.42 This was followed
by the drafting of an entirely new section regarding public sector employment
in the health care sector and amending Article 8:
local health care authorities can employ specialists as established by
existing contracts . . . regions can identify special areas of health care
services which require the adoption of public sector employment con-
tracts with them; for this purpose, those specialists in local surgeries
who, on 31 December 1992, have been working for five years as inde-
pendent contractors may apply to the first level of dirigenza, prior to
an evaluation of the established requirements.43
The parliamentary committee thus suggested that regional governments
identify areas of health care services as necessary. This was not consistent
with the announcement by the Treasury in 1994 that cost containment
would primarily affect personnel costs.44 The government accepted the
revision made by the parliamentary committee and issued the decree on
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24 November 1993, using the exact wording proposed by the Social Affairs
Committee.
The parliamentary majority was able to defeat its own government. As for
the parliamentary opposition, there could not be a clearer sign of its position
than the final no vote against the judgement proposed by the majority of the
committee. But the amendments of the majority and opposition are remarkably
similar on the issue of public employment. In terms of legislative content, the
Democrats of the Left (PDS – the major opposition party), the Communists
and the Northern League all voted against it. The rejection by the PDS of the
legislative text proposed by the majority contrasted sharply with its earlier
abstention vote in the 1992 reform and its stated intention of abstaining from
voting on the 1993 final committee judgement. In the committee debate preced-
ing the final voting on the judgement of the 1993 decree, the PDS offered the
majority an abstention vote because they were ‘satisfied with the majority’s
draft of the committee judgment’.45 The reason for the no-vote could be attrib-
uted less to discontent with the substance of the judgement and more to insuffi-
cient commitment on the part of the government to accept the committee’s
judgement, as some MPs claimed.46 During the parliamentary debate in
October and November 1993, the Democrats of the Left were dissatisfied
with the government’s plan of introducing high co-payments as instruments
to finance health care, rather than only as a means of controlling demand.
There was also criticism of the government’s lack of clarity about the financial
resources available for implementation of the new legislative decree. The
PDS’s involvement in the organisation of extra-parliamentary opposition and
direct action could also plausibly explain the no-vote instead of abstention.
The Health Care Committee of the Senate proposed a similar solution to
the reintroduction of excluded categories of consultants.47 It suggested, for
instance, that ‘regions can identify areas of activities for ambulatory special-
ists that require a public sector employment contract, after having consulted
their peak associations’. Although the final observations reported to the
government were similar to the legislative amendments of the lower
chamber, the debate in the Senate reflected the opposition’s much greater dis-
content with the inadequate solution to public employment issues. The debate
was more heated than in the lower chamber, and the opposition took a tougher
line, pointing out that the whole matter of public sector employment should
have been left to national collective bargaining rather than legislation. This
would presumably have given confederal trade unions more room for
manoeuvre. For instance, a senator noticed that ‘the reservations about the
regulation of public sector employment remain high and the difference with
the majority insurmountable’.48
The majority accepted the opposition’s amendment on the centrality of
national collective agreements and the role of trade unions in public sector
24 THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES
employment. Some amendments by majority senators reflected a similar
concern.49 A Christian Democrat senator complained about the ‘legislative
forcing on a matter that would need to be regulated by collective bargaining
and not law’.50 The parliamentary majority in the Senate therefore offered
the opposition, which had become more vociferous and confrontational, the
possibility of influencing the final legislative draft. The result of accommodat-
ing the opposition’s request was that it abstained from voting on the final
judgement, and did not vote against it. As one opposition senator explained:
‘despite the negative opinion on the formal aspects of the draft, we, the Demo-
crats of the Left, decide a vote of abstention because we appreciate the sub-
stantial changes formulated by this committee to the government legislative
decree’.51 Despite the heated debate and differences between the divided
majority and the opposition which had emerged in committee, the final vote
revealed the opening of the majority to those issues, about which the opposi-
tion had been particularly sensitive. Thus, the opposition revoked a no-vote.
Article 15 of the decree regulates the organisation, functions, access and
recruitment, and performance evaluation of senior medical professionals in
public hospitals, in accordance with the enabling law’s provision to identify
the different levels of dirigenza according to efficiency criteria – that is,
without increasing staff allocation plans, and by introducing fixed-term con-
tracts which are renewable on the basis of performance evaluation.52 The
legislative decree identifies two levels of dirigenza sanitaria which differed
in their functions and recruitment.53 The first – lower – level is recruited
through public competition, and the second one through appointment by
general managers. The draft decree incorporates provisions for performance
evaluation and results-oriented renewal of consultants’ employment contracts.
The entire category of ‘junior doctors’ was noticeably excluded by the
reduction from three to two levels of dirigenti. Despite the resistance of
other competent ministries, Article 18 comma 2-bis of the 1993 legislative
decree established that the first level of dirigenza could be articulated in
two economic, not legal, sub-levels, (a) and (b). The lower of these two econ-
omic levels, (b), included junior doctors, who would continued to be paid at
the same rate. However, after five years a junior doctor could automatically
be promoted to the higher level of dirigenza (level a), on the basis of an appli-
cation and performance evaluation, if a suitable vacancy were available. In
practice, the decree offered junior doctors the opportunity to remain salaried
employees of the public sector and to have the ‘legal’ status of dirigenti,
without an increase in public expenditure.
The final legislative decree issued was heavily influenced by the amend-
ments and observations of the Social Affairs Committee.54 The entire category
of junior doctors in hospitals was ‘rescued’. This is especially striking as the
government was severely criticised for attempting to apply uniformity to the
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different levels of dirigenti, according to a logic, typical of the 1970s, to take
distinct responsibilities away from managers, as one senator argued.55 In
response to this criticism, the minister of health, Garavaglia, reported her con-
flict with the Department of Public Services, which opposed any automatic
mechanism for career advancement. She informed the committee of her inten-
tion to propose to Public Services that regions could review staff allocation
plans so as to allow junior doctors to retain the position and privileges that
they had acquired.
The difference in content between the majority’s and the opposition’s
legislative amendments is easier to discern from the debate in the Senate
than the one in the lower chamber. There was hardly any dissent from the
opposition during the debate in anticipation of the final voting on the judge-
ment in the Social Affairs Committee of the lower chamber, but in the Senate
there was a high level of dissent from large parts of the majority and the
opposition. The majority in the Senate Health Care Committee reported to
the government that not only should junior doctors be maintained, they
should also be promoted automatically to the second and higher level of diri-
genza after ten years of seniority. This amendment triggered a heated debate
on the excessively favourable treatment of certain pressure groups.56 Others
pointed out that the amendment regarding junior doctors would exacerbate
the conflicts within the medical profession.57 Not only was the parliamentary
majority in the Senate divided on the issue of junior doctors, the opposition
also found the judgement unsatisfactory. The Democrats of the Left even
proposed an amendment, which was not accepted by the majority, to transfer
all doctors from level (a) to level (b) automatically after five years of
seniority.58
To conclude, analysis of the quality and process of legislative amendments
in standing committees, in both chambers, demonstrates a wide scope for scru-
tiny of delegated legislation, mainly through the substantial amending powers
of such committees. The Social Affairs Committee in the lower chamber was
able to create whole new sections of legislation to defeat the government’s
plan. Public sector employment of the medical profession was a problematic
issue, on which the majority and opposition revealed rhetorically different but
legislatively common positions. The climate in committees was constructive
and consociational.59 The opposition, which was able to exploit divisions
within the majority to augment its own influence, proposed amendments
which were widely accepted by the majority. The final voting behaviour of
the opposition suggests that the parliamentary arena cannot be shielded
from extra-parliamentary political mobilisation, including direct action and
trade union strategies. Voting behaviour in this case, if looked at in isolation,
would have been a misleading indicator of the characteristics of the legislative
process.
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PROCEDURES MATTER FOR A SIDELINED PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION
On 30 November 1998, parliament passed enabling law no.419, which set out
the guidelines for a structural reform of the national health care system, fol-
lowed by legislative decree no.229 issued by the centre-left Prodi government
on 19 June 1999. This reform has been labelled ‘one of the most ambitious
attempts in Europe to produce a detailed regulatory framework’.60 Its aim
was to review core structural issues of the 1992 Amato reform, including
the reforms of the employment contracts of hospital consultants and the auth-
orisation and accreditation procedures of private providers, the creation of
new agencies and consultative committees, the rationalisation of hospital net-
works, and other matters. In particular, the 1999 Bindi reform, named after the
minister of health, recognised that the internal market introduced in 1992
required scrupulous regulation and assumed that this could not be left to the
regions, where the pace of implementation varied.
The 1999 Bindi reform launched four sets of regulatory measures. These
were aimed at promoting strategic planning, through a hierarchical process
of national, regional and public enterprises planning, so as to regulate compe-
tition, assess the quality of care and promote cooperation between providers.
As far as regulating competition in the internal market was concerned,
two main strategies were adopted. First, to regulate purchasing functions,
quality and cost should be compared and evaluated when selecting and author-
ising suppliers to provide services with public funding. The 1999 reform
established three steps for selecting providers: authorisation granted by muni-
cipalities to build new facilities or modify old ones; authorisation granted by
regional health care departments to deliver health care services; and insti-
tutional accreditation, granted by the region after a regular assessment of
quality and an evaluation of the value-added by existing health care services.
Accreditation was mandatory for contractual agreements, which were nego-
tiated between local health care authorities and ‘preferred providers’ chosen
by the authorities themselves and the regions on a value-for-money basis
among those already accredited.
The second strategy adopted to regulate competition was to regulate pro-
fessionals and clarify the boundaries between public and private practice
within public hospitals. Article 15-quarter of the legislative decree no.229/
1999 is concerned with the terms and conditions of hospital-based consultants,
in particular with ‘exclusive’ public employment contracts. These contracts
were established only if doctors decided to exercise private consultancy
solely within the public hospital they worked for (intramoenia). ‘Exclusive’
contracts apply automatically to all consultants employed after 31 December
1998. Extramoenia activities were made incompatible with an exclusive con-
tract. Regulating hospital-based doctors’ private consultancy in this way
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allowed human resources to be used more efficiently and waiting lists reduced.
Minister Bindi was herself ideologically committed to reducing the inequality
between patients who could afford to pay for private consultancy and patients
who could not afford to pay and consequently had to wait. Exclusive contracts
were a way of correcting distorted practices which put public hospitals at a dis-
advantage to their private competitors. These specialised only in the most prof-
itable aspects of health care, without providing emergency services and so on.
The main benefit to consultants of exclusive contracts is the increase in
pay.61 But the reduction in pay for those who opt out, by deciding to retain
their private practice extramoenia, is more significant. This reduction in pay
is estimated at approximately 30 per cent, in light of financial measures intro-
duced in the 1999 Budget Law. Those who opt out are not entitled to perform-
ance-related pay either. Hospital consultants who opt for extramoenia cannot
be appointed to managerial positions within public hospitals.62 The exclusive
contract gives privileged access to university teaching and research appoint-
ments and also to continuing education.63 However, the Bindi legislative
decree clearly states that hospital-based consultants must prioritise their
public health work over private consultancy, even for intramoenia activity.64
In the parliamentary debate, the controversy is not so much about the
demand for regulation of private consultancy as about the punitive measures
and sanctions contained in the decree against those who opt out of intramoenia
private activities. One opposition senator of the opposition claimed that ‘exclu-
sive contracts are a critical issue in the regulation of employment contracts, but
should not be pursued in such a top-down style . . . instead it should be left to the
autonomy of hospitals in order to fulfil the expectation deriving from their
autonomous public enterprise status’.65 Clearly the Bindi decree does not
only build in economic and promotion-related incentives to doctors opting
for intramoenia and an exclusive contract with public hospitals; it also estab-
lishes sanctions for those who opt out. This aspect has been the most controver-
sial part of regulation, and has been attacked by the opposition parties.
The majority in parliament was generally disciplined and supported the
government’s decree. In the lower chamber’s Social Affairs Committee, the
majority spokeswoman declared the issue of exclusive contracts ‘non-
negotiable’.66 She fully espoused the government’s plan for greater regulation
with regard to the behaviour of hospital doctors.67 But some majority MPs
expressed concern about the financial resources needed to support exclusive con-
tracts and the resulting higher salaries of hospital consultants.68 The issue of the
financial resources needed to support the decree also preoccupied the opposition
parties.69 However, the opposition in the lower chamber mainly focused on
procedural issues rather than technical aspects of the legislative decree.
The opposition in the Social Affairs Committee of the lower chamber
claimed that the parliamentary procedures adopted by the government violated
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parliamentary standing orders. They successfully engaged the president of the
chamber, Violante, on the problematic legality of the legislative decree intro-
duced for parliamentary scrutiny in the committee. The opposition proved the
existence of an amended draft decree incorporating the opinions expressed by
the confederal trade unions that the committee had not received. This new draft
was negotiated by the government directly with the trade unions and the
regions. The committee was therefore analysing a draft which had been
subsequently changed by the Department of Health. The evidence of parallel
ongoing negotiations with trade unions and resulting changes to the draft
decree was, according to opposition MPs, the existence of a letter containing
an amended version of the draft decree which the government had sent to
the trade unions. Another piece of evidence was the new version of the majority
committee judgement proposed on 2 June 1999.70 The conflict came to a head
when the opposition occupied the committee room, due to the uncompromising
position of the majority and its own inability to influence the legislative work.71
The government negotiated the final draft of the legislative decree with the
trade unions and with some of the main associations of the medical profession,
noticeably Associazione Nazionale Assistenti e Aiuti Ospedalieri (ANAAO),72
effectively excluding the parliamentary arena from influence over the allegedly
new version of the decree. The president of the chamber, called upon to oversee
the legality of the legislative procedures, appeared to acknowledge the ineffec-
tiveness of parliamentary scrutiny, admitting that the enabling law was
inadequate and urging for new provisions so that the judgement of the parlia-
mentary committee could be more forceful in the legislative process.73
Despite the conflict during the decision-making process of the committee, the
majority was united against the claims of the opposition. It refused to
suspend the committee meeting, as requested, and to grant the reopening of
the entire debate on the new legislative draft which had been negotiated by
Bindi with trade unions. All the opposition parties voted against the final com-
mittee judgement, which they had been unable to influence in substantive terms.
The parliamentary debate in the Senate Health Care Committee was not
generally marked by vehement opposition or by acts of rebellion, such as
leaving the committee or occupying the committee room. The opposition’s
contribution seemed to be related to the merits of the draft decree and the tech-
nical aspects of the legislation. The procedural concerns raised in the lower
chamber remained subordinate to the constructive climate of debate. For
instance, with regard to the issue of exclusive contracts, the opposition con-
tested the negative consequences on doctors’ career and promotion prospects
if they opted for extramoenia. This was claimed to curb professional auton-
omy and freedom of choice.74 As one senator claimed, ‘the draft decree
denies a real exercise of a choice between intramoenia and extramoenia, so
that the right to choose is a virtual right. It introduces exclusive contracts in
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a highly discriminatory way’.75 Exclusive contracts were thus not criticised
per se, but as punitive sanctions against those practising privately in extramoe-
nia. 76 Despite these substantive observations, the final judgement was not
substantially affected by the opposition’s amendments.
Unlike the parliamentary committee debate in the lower chamber, which
revealed a solid majority area, there was some dissent to the government’s
plan in the Senate. Critics suggested leaving large parts of the regulation of
the profession to national collective bargaining.77 One senator disagreed
with the intramoenia provisions because they were an additional source of
inefficiency, since a parallel area of services and administrative structures
had to be created within the hospital itself. This parallel internal area of ser-
vices could take key financial and human resources away from the hospital’s
core activities.78
To conclude, unlike the legislative process in 1993, empirical findings
regarding the 1999 case suggest that the parliamentary majority supported
the government in a more disciplined way. The rejection of most of the oppo-
sition’s requests and legislative amendments shows this. In the lower chamber,
the decision-making style was confrontational and the opposition had to adjust
to the majority’s strategy of ‘non-negotiable issues’ by raising primarily pro-
cedural and formalistic concerns. The majority did not only refuse the opposi-
tion’s amendments, it also greatly minimised the overall committee debate on
the issue of regulating doctors’ private practice. The parliamentary majority
presented a proposal on the legislative decree for consideration by the commit-
tee, which included very few amendments on the issue of private consultancy.
Clearly the strategy of the majority was to keep this issue away from parlia-
mentary debate and divert it to other institutional and policy venues. The con-
frontational and competitive relationship with the opposition in parliament
was unlike the constructive atmosphere of the extra-parliamentary nego-
tiations between Minister Bindi and some trade unions and ‘insider’
medical groups. Negotiation and mediation with civil society took place
outside the parliamentary arena, in accordance with the government’s strategy
of dealing with public sector employment matters through direct contact with
the unions, unlike in 1993. It was not by chance that massive direct action and
strikes, planned for the end of May 1999, were called off before parliament
had expressed its final approval.
FROM PARLIAMENTARY CO-GOVERNMENT TO EXECUTIVE LEGISLATION:
PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY OF THE 1993 AND 1999 HEALTH CARE
REFORMS COMPARED
During the parliamentary scrutiny of the draft legislative decree, the legisla-
tive process of the 1993 health care reform was marked by parliamentary
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committees in both chambers of parliament exercising substantive scrutiny
over the policy-making process. Entirely new legislative sections were
created. These dealt with crucial issues that were far from being technical
minutiae. In spite of unfavourable financial circumstances, parliament was
able to influence the government to increase public expenditure by reabsorb-
ing excluded doctors into the public sector. Parliament significantly influ-
enced the first legislative process analysed in this article; not only
producing amendments and detailed observations, but undermining some
of the government’s key objectives, such as financial austerity.
The most remarkable feature of the 1993 case was the political and actual
contribution made by the opposition in shaping delegated legislation at the
parliamentary stage. The relationship between the legislative majority and
the opposition was a cooperative one, and they collaborated on the formu-
lation of amendments. The legislative majority effectively became the govern-
ing majority. The extent of the parliamentary opposition’s involvement can
more easily be revealed by analysing its amendments in detail, rather than
by considering only the way it voted during the final judgement of the com-
mittee. The opposition voted against the majority judgement on the legislative
decree in the lower chamber, and decided to abstain in the Senate. But there
was a great degree of agreement on the important issues, despite their
highly contentious nature.79
Although committees theoretically fulfil only a consultative function with
regard to delegated legislation, on this occasion the actual effects on the leg-
islative decree were similar to parliamentary co-government; particularly
when the government was forced to change its original draft and accept fun-
damental revisions. This feature of the legislative process is associated with
a reactive type of legislature.80 Traditionally and constitutionally, legislative
powers are not clearly separated in the Italian political system, but are
merged in a ‘unified mechanism’.81 Although several institutions participate
in the legislative process, determining an institutional polycentrism82 which
is not easily amenable to majority decisions and firm executive leadership,
the distinctiveness of delegated legislation should be that the locus of the leg-
islative function is clearly defined and coordinated, in theory, by the executive
only. Yet during the transition period in 1993, the Italian Parliament’s predo-
minant pattern of co-government83 does not seem to have been altered even by
the use of delegated legislation by ‘technocratic governments’, when greater
executive autonomy could reasonably have been expected. As one MP said:
‘the legislative process responds to a contractual logic, being characterised
by the need to settle conflicts and disputes so that a legal act fulfils the function
of political compromise; yet, once a legal act has been created, its functions
are no longer useful’.84
PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY OF THE EXECUTIVE IN ITALY 31
The empirical investigation of parliamentary influence over the Prodi
government’s 1999 legislative decree reforming health care revealed the
effects of the changing relationship between the parliamentary majority and
the opposition. The scope for parliament to change the government’s objec-
tives and affect policy was much reduced. The legislative majority supported
the government at the expense of cooperation with the opposition. With regard
to regulating the medical profession, the majority declared this issue ‘non-
negotiable’. This was confirmed by findings related to the final committee
judgement which resulted primarily from the legislative majority’s work.
The centre-left Prodi government, owing to a more disciplined majority in
the committees in both chambers of parliament, was able to steer the
process of delegated legislation much more effectively than the Ciampi
government in 1993. The majority refused most of the requests made by the
opposition, including numerous procedural observations. In fact, the opposi-
tion was raising procedural matters because it did not have any opportunity
to exert influence over the more concrete aspects of the legislation.
The style of decision-making in committees during the debate about the
1999 legislative decree was not consensual. In 1993, mediation and compro-
mise prevailed throughout the legislative process. But the debate in the stand-
ing committees about the 1999 Bindi reform was characterised by conflict and
confrontation, such as the opposition’s request to suspend the committee ses-
sions or to refer supposed procedural abuses to the president of the chamber.
The voting pattern on amendments did not reflect consociational practices, as
the opposition in the lower chamber voted cohesively against the majority’s
final judgement. It has been argued that consensual law-making continued
to prevail during the 1990s, in spite of polarisation.85 But this argument is
based primarily on quantitative data referring to the assembly rather than to
committees.86
CONCLUSION
By the end of the 1990s, the Italian parliament’s impact on policy had dimin-
ished considerably, despite its capacity as an institution to retain and
strengthen its formal and procedural role of scrutinising the decreti legislativi.
The change of parliamentary scrutiny of secondary legislation from substan-
tive to procedural can be ascribed to the difference in the behaviour of the par-
liamentary opposition, determined by the bipolarisation of the party system.
The bipolar structure of party competition has a greater effect on the dynamics
between majority and opposition in parliament than the government
coalition’s arguably greater cohesiveness.87 Bipolarisation makes the line of
demarcation between legislative majority and opposition much clearer,
whereas it is blurred where there is multi-polar competition. Consolidated
32 THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES
bipolarisation of the party system is likely to hinder the consociational
practices and cross-party inter-factional cooperation of 1993. It also induces
much greater accord between the formal government majority and the
‘working’ majority, namely the informal legislative coalitions.
Despite procedural and organisational continuity – such as the persistence
of a highly institutionalised committee structure in the Italian Parliament88 –
and increased complexity in the procedural rules for parliamentary scrutiny of
delegated legislation, the influence of parliament over executive policy
decisions and especially the power of parliamentary committees to change
secondary legislation89 have been considerably reduced as a consequence of
the bipolarisation of the party system. Some legislative scholars argue that
effective parliamentary influence over government depends on organisational
and procedural dimensions, for it ‘is greatest when a legislature is highly insti-
tutionalised’.90 Although this institutionalisation is necessary, it does not
appear to be sufficient. The effect of bipolarisation of the party system on
the parliamentary opposition’s performance and strategies is the single most
important factor in understanding the diminishing effectiveness of parliamen-
tary scrutiny of delegated legislation. The interna corporis of the Italian
Parliament appears to have less impact than has previously been claimed on
the effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny of delegated legislation.
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